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Abstract— As power systems increasingly rely on gas-fired 
power plants (GFPP), and as thermal cycling requirements in-
crease due to larger penetrations of intermittent generation, the 
long-term service agreements (LTSAs) that define the conditions 
and costs for GFPP maintenance are exerting more economic 
influence over a power system’s short-term operations.  
In a previous paper, the authors proposed a unit commitment 
formulation that explicitly represents LTSAs and showed that 
these operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts substantially 
impact the cost of economic dispatch when GFPPs are forced to 
intensively cycle. The authors also showed that properly model-
ing these contracts can substantially alter a power system’s short-
term optimal scheduling.  
Traditional LTSAs were designed assuming that (especially) 
combined cycle gas turbines would operate in a base-loaded 
regime. In new operating regimes characterized by heavy cycling, 
GFPPs with traditional LTSAs can incur excessive cycling costs. 
It may be possible for owners of these GFPPs to renegotiate their 
existing LTSAs for more flexible conditions that will allow their 
GFPPs to cycle at lower costs, even if this renegotiation requires 
the owner to pay an upfront expense. 
In this paper, we propose a formulation aimed at supporting 
the process of optimizing LTSAs contracts for a portfolio of 
GFPPs. 
Index Terms—cycling, major overhaul, O&M, operations and 
maintenance, gas-fired power plants, unit commitment 
NOTATION 
The notation used is stated below for quick reference. Other 
symbols are defined as needed throughout the paper. 
Indices: 
i = 1..I Individual power plant in the system 
t = 1..T Time step (hour) 
n = 1..N LTSA contract 
j = 1..J LTSA plane 
Parameters: 
 ,  , Minimum and maximum output level of plant i 
 ,   Ramp up and ramp down limits of plant i 
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Csu,i Start-up cost of plant i 
Csdi Shut-down cost of plant i 
Cnli No load cost of plant i 
Cvi Variable generation cost of plant i 
MOCn LTSA cost for contract n 
Dt Power demand (perfectly inelastic) for hour t  
	
, , 	
, Each (firing hours, starts) point that defines the 
boundaries of the Maintenance Interval Func-
tion (see Fig. 2) 
Positive variables: 
qi,t Total generation level for plant i 
wi,t Generation level for plant i and hour t above its 
minimum  
MOCuci Maintenance cost for plant i to be allocated over 
the simulated unit commitment time horizon  
Binary variables: 
yi,t Start-up decision for plant i and hour t 
zi,t Shut-down decision for plant i 
ui,t Commitment state for plant i 
ci,n LTSA decision for plant i and contract n; ci,n=1 
denotes that plant i is assigned to contract n 
I. INTRODUCTION 
as-fired power plants (GFPPs) play a unique economic, 
operational, and environmental role in power systems. 
Carbon prices (and other regulations aimed at limiting future 
emissions) in Europe and the production of shale gas in the 
United States has allowed GFPPs to displace coal units in the 
merit order of many power systems. In addition to this eco-
nomic effect, as power systems continue to transition toward 
capacity mixes that feature more intermittent generation from 
variable energy resources (VERs) such as wind and solar, their 
need for increased operational flexibility with respect to more 
frequent cycling1 operations will likely translate into greater 
need for GFPPs. [1][2]  
As power systems increasingly rely on GFPPs, and as cy-
cling requirements increase due to larger penetrations of in-
termittent generation, the long-term service agreements 
(LTSAs) that define and govern the conditions and costs for 
gas-fired power plant maintenance are playing an increasingly 
relevant role in a power system’s dispatch decisions. 
 
1 The term “cycling” refers to the cyclical operating modes of thermal 
plants that occur in response to dispatch requirements: on/off operation, low-
load cycling operations and load following. 
Optimizing Long-Term Service Agreements 
for gas-fired units in the context of increasing 
penetration of intermittent generation 
T. Leung, M. Sánchez-González, P. Rodilla, C. Batlle 
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LTSAs originated as a method for GFPP owners and origi-
nal equipment manufacturers to share risk. The generic terms 
of an LTSA usually involve a premium paid by the GFPP 
owner to the equipment manufacturer (or an alternative O&M 
provider) in exchange for plant O&M service over a time 
period defined by a maintenance interval function (MIF). By 
signing LTSAs, GFPP owners gain more certainty about their 
maintenance costs. Original equipment manufacturers, on the 
other hand, due to their expertise with their own equipment, 
can be relatively certain of the cost of maintaining a GFPP as 
long as the owner operates the GFPP under the conditions 
specified by the LTSA and its MIF. [3] 
Although the MIF can take many different forms, almost all 
MIFs specify a number of operation hours (firing hours) after 
which a GFPP must be taken offline for major maintenance (at 
a significant cost). Additionally, most MIFs also assign a 
number of equivalent operating hours (EOH) to each start such 
that each start reduces the remaining number of allowed firing 
hours. For example, if the EOH of an MIF is 10 firing hours, 
then starting a GFPP once reduces the time until its next major 
maintenance by 10 operating hours (the blue line in Fig. 1).  
Alternatively, an increasingly common approach for repre-
senting the MIF consists of defining both a maximum number 
of starts and a maximum number of firing hours. Whichever 
limit the GFPP reaches first triggers the major overhaul in-
spection of the turbine. Fig. 1 shows this alternative MIF in 
yellow. For this alternative MIF, if the number of starts is not 
relevant (i.e. if a GFPP hits its firing hours limit first) then no 
additional O&M-related cost per start should be considered. If 
the GFPP cycles frequently and reaches its starts limit first, the 
O&M-related cost per start can be significant. [3] 
 
Fig. 1. Hot gas path maintenance [4] 
Since the premium that GFPP owners pay represents their 
cost of maintenance once they exceed the firing hours/starts 
boundary of the MIF, the terms of an LTSA can impact a 
system’s optimal scheduling decisions. In most cases, tradi-
tional LTSAs were designed assuming a rather stable (base-
loaded) regime. The generators did not foresee that GFPPs 
would need to cycle frequently. Consequently, these contracts 
included certain conditions and constraints that imply signifi-
cant costs for GFPPs that start and shut down often. 
In the new context of significant renewable penetration that 
many power systems around the world are currently observ-
ing, two new problems arise. The first one consists of adapting 
the unit commitment problem (hereafter UC problem) to take 
into account the impact of these contracts, while the second 
problem entails searching for ways to redesign or renegotiate 
some of the conditions of these contracts to minimize the 
overall cost of cycling. 
We take as a starting point the first of the two problems, al-
ready discussed in [5], and explore the second topic. 
A. Modeling the impact of LTSAs in the UC problem 
Generally, the vast majority of existing formulations for the 
UC problem consider O&M costs by means of a volumetric 
cost adder associated with the total energy produced (typically 
referred to as variable O&M cost and expressed in $/MWh) 
[6][7][8][9]. This is in line with the operation of GFPPs in a 
base-loaded regime where the number of starts is irrelevant for 
O&M purposes. 
Recently, authors such as [10] and [5] have shown that alt-
hough this simplified approach is reasonable when cycling 
needs are moderate, using a volumetric cost adder imprecisely 
models actual costs when cycling demands increase. Further-
more, this approximated allocation of costs leads to inefficient 
UC and scheduling results. In [10], the authors argue that the 
operational costs of a power system can quickly deviate from 
predicted costs using traditional UC models if cycling opera-
tions dynamically alter a power plant’s start-up cost due to 
accumulated wear and tear. In [5], the authors highlight that a 
GFPP’s LTSA may create additional and unprecedented oper-
ation costs for GFPP owners when plants are required to cycle 
significantly. The authors also proposed a UC formulation that 
explicitly represents LTSAs and demonstrated how these 
maintenance contracts can substantially alter a power system’s 
optimal short-term dispatch decisions. 
B. Selecting the appropriate LTSA contract 
As noted by [11] and [12], the selection of an LTSA can re-
alistically pose quite a difficult challenge for GFPP owners 
due to a variety of reasons ranging from uncertainty about a 
plant’s future operating regime to lack of clarity about what 
materials and costs should be covered by the LTSA; defining 
the time duration of the LTSA (e.g., whether it should be de-
fined in starts, firing hours, or absolute time); determining the 
warranty period for parts installed at the end of the LTSA; 
calculating the appropriate compensation for nonperformance 
if the equipment manufacturer is unable to restore a GFPP to 
proper operation; and defining termination clauses if the 
equipment manufacturer is unable to meet its obligations.  
Additionally, as discussed in [13], as GFPPs roll off their 
existing LTSAs or as owners consider the possibility of early 
termination, the process of renegotiating an LTSA can be 
equally difficult. One example of this difficulty is the common 
“true-up” clause that requires each party to be made whole at 
the time of termination; calculating the amount of money that 
should change hands is not straightforward given the infor-
mation asymmetry between the plant owner and the equipment 
manufacturer. Another problem is the market-pricing clause of 
LTSAs that allows owners to terminate a contract if that con-
tract’s costs are no longer competitive because of the difficulty 
of directly comparing multiple LTSAs. Once an owner signs 
or renews an LTSA, if the operating conditions in the power 
system unexpectedly change—for example, if the system 
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experiences a large and rapid deployment of VER—plant 
owners may find that their LTSAs restrain their ability to 
efficiently operate their GFPPs.  
This exact problem has affected GFPPs in Spain. In the 
Spanish power system, 25 GWs of GFPPs were installed in the 
last decade with the expectation that the load factor of these 
plants would not fall below 50%. On average, from 2001 to 
2006, electricity demand grew annually by approximately 5%; 
since 2009, however, demand has fallen annually by about 
2%. In 2013, wind covered 21% of demand and solar covered 
5% of demand. In 2013, GFPPs produced only 25 TWh, re-
sulting in a load factor of approximately 10%. The dramatic 
decrease of demand coupled with the strong penetration of 
wind and solar has reduced the total number of hours that 
GFPPs operate for while increasing their number of starts over 
the same time period. 
A first step to respond to this new and unexpected operating 
environment as load factors decrease and cycling needs in-
crease is to consider the impact of LTSAs in the UC problem; 
the authors in [5] addressed this need. However, as the cycling 
needs of power systems continue to grow, power generation 
companies may benefit from renegotiating the existing terms 
of their LTSAs and modifying their number of allowed starts. 
By successfully renegotiating its LTSA portfolio, a generation 
company may be able to better adapt to its contemporary op-
erating regime (e.g., from a system with initially few VERs to 
a system with a large penetration of VERs) and run its GFPPs 
more economically than before. 
In this paper, we support the process of constructing an op-
timal portfolio of LTSA contracts by extending the UC formu-
lation in [5]. First, we design an optimization problem to con-
sider different LTSA contracts with the objective of selecting 
an optimal LTSA portfolio for a fleet of GFPP plants. Then, 
using the proposed formulation, we present a method to solve 
the problem of properly pricing an alternate LTSA contract 
relative to an LTSA with a defined MIF and known price. We 
also discuss how this approach can be used to determine the 
renegotiation price that the owner of GFPP should be willing 
to pay to change from one LTSA to another. For the situation 
where an owner may be able to renegotiate the LTSAs for a 
group of plants, the proposed pricing methodology yields a 
price-quantity “curve” that illustrates the number of plants that 
would switch to the alternate LTSA as a function of that alter-
nate LTSA’s price. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II contains the 
proposed UC formulation to optimize an LTSA portfolio. 
Section III describes the procedure for pricing alternate LTSA 
contracts. Section IV contains data about the case study pre-
sented in this paper for optimizing LTSA portfolios and pric-
ing an unknown LTSA, and Section V describes the results of 
the case study. Lastly, Section VI concludes.  
II. OPTIMAL LTSA PORTFOLIO CONTRACTING  
As noted in the introduction, a GFPP owner can commit to a 
variety of LTSAs with equipment providers. The suitability of 
an LTSA mainly depends on each GFPP’s expected cycling 
regime. However, as discussed in [9], the characteristics of an 
LTSA can also significantly condition a GFPP’s cycling re-
gime. This interdependency complicates the GFPP owner’s 
decision and requires that the owner consider both the (ex-
pected) dispatch and the selection of the optimal contract sim-
ultaneously. Additionally, if the decision involves not just one 
GFPP, but rather a portfolio of GFPPs, the owner may be able 
to plan for some units to cycle more frequently and others to 
cycle less frequently. Such a decision would lead the portfolio 
owner to sign different LTSAs for different GFPPs. In this 
section, we aim to solve the portfolio owner’s contracting 
problem by proposing a novel formulation that reveals what an 
optimally constructed LTSA portfolio should resemble. 
A. Constructing an optimal LTSA portfolio 
To optimize an LTSA portfolio, we take the perspective of a 
cost-minimizing central planner2. We also assume the ability 
to simultaneously make initial contract decisions for all plants. 
Under these assumptions, we can begin to examine the opti-
mal LTSA portfolio by minimizing the total costs required to 
supply the electricity demand: 
 [, + , + , + ,], +
∑   (1) 
The objective function sums hourly no-load and generation 
costs for all plants. To balance supply and demand and remain 
within the technical limits of each power plant, we add the 
following basic operational constraints for dispatch and UC3. 
 , =  ∀"
, = #, + ,∀, "
, ≤ ,∀, "
, ≥ ,∀, "
, − ,'( ≤ ∀, "
(, − ,'()(−1) ≤ ∀, "
, = ,'( + , − ,∀, "
, , , ≤ 1∀, "
,, , , , , ≥ 0∀, "
, ∈ {0,1}∀, "
 (2) 
Thus far, the objective function in (1) and the constraints in 
(2) reflect the basic traditional UC formulation, with exception 
to the last term in the objective function. This last term replac-
es the fixed-adder representation of O&M cost with an explicit 
representation of the maintenance cost based on each plant’s 
LTSA.  
In [5], the maintenance cost 1 (i.e., the LTSA cost 
for plant i to be allocated over the simulated UC time horizon) 
is determined based on the LTSA’s MIF. To determine the 
exact cost, the authors proposed explicitly adding the follow-
ing constraint for each triangular region ∢34345( of the MIF 
(see Fig. 2 below). 
 
2 As well known, under perfect competition, an individual firm’s profit-
maximizing decisions are identical to the central planner’s welfare-
maximizing/cost-minimizing decisions 
3 As the objective of this paper is to demonstrate the impacts of the LTSA 
decision, for the sake of simplicity we have omitted many well-known unit 
commitment constraints. 
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Fig. 2. MIF Region for an LTSA contract 
(	
 − 	
67) ,
−(	
 − 	
67) ,
+1(	
	
67 − 	
67	
)
≥ 0∀, 8( , , , ) ∈ ∢34345(∀j
 (3) 
Assuming that the MIF is convex and that each plant oper-
ates under an exogenously determined LTSA, solving the 
following mixed-integer linear program yields the cost-
minimizing UC and dispatch decisions for each plant: 
min (1)
. ". (2) + (3)	 
In the UC formulation above, the set of planes that define 
the cost in each angular region (∢34345(∀j) model the 
LTSA for each plant i. Here, we propose to extend the ap-
proach by removing the assumption of an exogenously deter-
mined LTSA and allow the optimization to assign each plant 
to one of N potential LTSAs. Each LTSA has its own mainte-
nance interval function defined by ∢34,A345(,A∀j and its own 
premium A. To endogenize the LTSA decision, we intro-
duce a special ordered set type one (SOS1) binary variable, 
1,A, for each possible combination of plant i and LTSA n: 
1,A ∈ {0,1}
 1,AA = 1
 (4) 
and modify constraint (3) as follows with a big-M constraint:  
 , A B	
, − 	
67,C
− , A B	
, − 	
67,C
+1 B	
,	
67, − 	
67,A	
,C
≥ D1,A − 1E∀, ,8D , , , E ∈ ∢34345(∀j
 (5) 
Reformulating the constraint in this manner requires the 
solver to assign one LTSA to each power plant. For all unse-
lected LTSAs where cG,H = 0, constraint (5) will be nonbind-
ing because the right-hand expression evaluates to a large 
negative number, and MOCG is nonnegative.  
For the selected LTSA where cG,H = 1, the right-hand side 
of constraint (5) evaluates to 0, and constraint (5) becomes 
equivalent to constraint (3). Consequently, at any given time, 
the cost of maintenance for plant i can be determined as a 
function of the selected LTSA. For practicality, M above can 
take on the value of the largest premium of the available 
LTSAs. Combining this modification with the traditional UC 
constraints results in a mixed-integer linear program that re-
turns optimal UC, dispatch, and LTSA portfolio decisions for 
a power system: 
min (1)
. ". (2) + (4) + (5)	 (6) 
III. PRICING AN ALTERNATE LTSA WITH A KNOWN 
MAINTENANCE INTERVAL FUNCTION 
In the previous section, the proposed formulation in (6) op-
timally chooses an LTSA to assign to each power plant given 
that every potential LTSA n has a known maintenance interval 
function and a known premium. In reality, a firm may want to 
evaluate its optimal portfolio strategy given the possibility of 
switching (through renegotiation with the O&M provider) to a 
particular alternate LTSA with a known maintenance interval 
function, but with an unknown cost premium.  
To address this contract renegotiation problem, we iterative-
ly apply the proposed formulation from the previous section to 
construct a price-quantity curve that identifies how many 
plants in the power system should switch to the alternate 
LTSA at a specific premium.  
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all of the power 
plants have contracted the same default LTSA (1,ANO = 1∀), 
that no firing hours or starts have been accumulated yet under 
this LTSA for any plant, and that there is only one potential 
alternate LTSA to switch to. The approach could be extended 
straightforwardly to more complex contexts. 
The iteration begins by exogenously setting the LTSA’s 
premium, AN(, at a high enough price such that all plants 
remain on the default contract after solving the optimization 
problem in (6); then, with each new iteration, decrement the 
price of the alternate LTSA until all plants switch (1,AN( =
1∀). As the premium of the alternate contract, AN(, 
alters the number plants that should switch LTSAs, we obtain 
a price-quantity switching curve. 
IV. CASE STUDY: DATA 
In this case study, we explore the LTSA portfolio decisions 
for a stylized power system consisting of 1 nuclear power 
plant and 10 combined-cycle gas turbines operating hourly 
over a duration of one month. Table 1 contains the technical 
operating limits for each technology, while Table 2 contains 
cost information for each technology from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration [14]. 
TABLE I 
THERMAL PLANT DATA 
 Nuclear CCGT 
Number of Units 1 10 
Maximum Output [MW] 1000 400 
Minimum Output [MW] N/A 160 
TABLE II 
THERMAL COST DATA 
 Nuclear CCGT 
Heat Rate [kBTU/MWh] N/A 7.05 
Fuel Price [$/kBTU] N/A 4.93 
Variable Operations [$/MWh] 6.62 34.73 
Start-Up [$/start-mw] 1000 75 
No Load Cost [$] - 2200 
Each GFPP can sign one of two potential LTSAs with a rec-
tangular MIF as shown in Fig. 3. Each LTSA’s maintenance 
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interval function can be defined piece-wise linearly using two 
planes and the values in Table 3 to construct ∢34,A345(,A∀P. 
The first LTSA allows up to 250 starts and 25,000 firing 
hours; the second LTSA allows the same 25,000 firing hours, 
but increases the maximum number of starts to 750. 
 
Fig. 3. Two alternate maintenance interval functions for GFPPs. 
TABLE III 
LTSA MAINTENANCE INTERVAL FUNCTIONS 
LTSA 34,A = (	
, , 	
,)  Q4,A = (R
, , R
,) 
LTSA n=1, plane j=1 (0, 250) (25000, 250) 
LTSA n=1, plane j=2 (25000, 250) (25000, 0) 
   
LTSA n=2, plane j=1 (0, 750) (25000, 750) 
LTSA n=2, plane j=2 (25000, 750) (25000, 0) 
For the case study, the UC operates across several determin-
istic demand scenarios. The demand curve is adapted (by 
taking the hourly profile) from the one of the Spanish system 
in 2012 and peaks at 4500MW. The VER production profile is 
taken from the solar PV generation in Spain in 2012. In the 
remaining scenarios, this VER capacity is increased by 25%, 
43%, and 60%. In both scenarios, to account for VERs, we 
subtract the total amount of energy supplied by VERs in each 
hour from the total demand in the same hour to obtain the net 
demand that thermal plants must cover. Fig. 4 below illustrates 
a typical week of demand and scheduling for the first scenario. 
 
Fig. 4. Representative weekly demand, VER generation, and 
thermal scheduling results for the benchmark scenario 
V. CASE STUDY: RESULTS 
The MILP model in (6) has been formulated in GAMS and 
solved using CPLEX 12 on an Intel® Core™ 2 Quad CPU 
Q9650 @3.00 GHz with 4.00 Gb RAM. The computational 
time to solve the case study (33,536 variables, 8,948 integer 
variables, and 17,174 equations) was 6 minutes with ep-
gap=1% and 5 seconds when the problem is relaxed, using 4 
threads. 
In the first part of this case study, we determine the optimal 
LTSA portfolio for a power system assuming that the first 
LTSA (n=1) is priced at $10 million, and that the second 
LTSA (n=2) is priced at $20 million. The second LTSA is 
more flexible (offers more starts for the same number of firing 
hours), but the major overhaul cost is also more expensive. In 
the second part of the case study, we assume that all plants 
have already committed to the first LTSA and then explore 
how the portfolio changes as the price of the second LTSA’s 
premium changes. In the third part of the case study, we intro-
duce VERs into the power system to illustrate how LTSA 
decisions may change when GFPPs must operate in an envi-
ronment with fewer hours of generation and higher cycling 
frequencies. 
A. Constructing an optimal LTSA portfolio 
As a benchmark, we first solved (6) while fixing all contract 
decisions 1,( = 1, 1,S = 0	∀	. This benchmark scenario as-
signs all plants to the first LTSA. Then, we solved (6) again 
after removing the fixed values for 1,(and 1,S to obtain the 
following optimal LTSA portfolio for the power system: 
TABLE IV 
OPTIMAL LTSA PORTFOLIO DECISIONS 
Plant i LTSA 1 (ci,1) LTSA 2 (ci,2) 
1 1 0  
2 0  1 
3 0  1 
4 1 0  
5 1 0  
6 1 0  
7 1 0  
8 1 0  
9 0  1 
10 0  1 
Table V summarizes the cost differences for operations and 
maintenance and total operation between the two. Although 
optimizing the LTSA portfolio only reduced total operating 
costs by approximately 1% relative to the benchmark scenario, 
the portfolio optimization substantially changed operations 
and maintenance costs by approximately 20%.  
TABLE V 
O&M AND TOTAL COST COMPARISONS OF LTSA PORTFOLIOS 
 Benchmark  Optimal  ∆ cost 
O&M [M$] 3,195  2,612  18,24%  
Obj. [M$] 71,617  70,706  1,27%  
In addition to reducing operating costs, the selection and 
representation of LTSAs in the UC formulation clearly im-
pacts the optimal set of short-term generation and commitment 
decisions. Fig. 5 plots each GFPP’s starts and firing hours 
onto the two available LTSAs after one month (744 hours) of 
operation. The graph shows that an optimal firing-hours-to-
starts ratio exists for each contract, and that the UC tends to 
dispatch plants along their optimal firing-hours-to-starts ratio 
(more specifically, the UC formulation simultaneously decides 
the optimal LTSA contract and firing-hours-to-starts ratio).  
For the case study, the optimal operating ratio for the first 
contract is 25,000/50 = 100 fired hours/start, and the optimal 
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operating ratio for the second contract is 25,000/750 = 33.3 
fired hours/start. 
 
Fig. 5. Optimal starts-to-firing-hours ratio for GFPPs in the portfolio 
B. Pricing an alternate contract and renegotiating an LTSA 
portfolio 
In the previous section, the UC formulation assigned each 
GFPP to one of two potential LTSAs with known premiums 
($10 million for the first contract, $20 million for the second). 
Another realistic problem to consider is that firms may need to 
evaluate an alternative contract where the maintenance inter-
val function is known, but the premium is not. This is the case 
when there is a potential renegotiation opportunity between a 
firm and an equipment manufacturer. When the renegotiation 
affects a portfolio of plants, then firms will need to evaluate 
the number of plants that they would be willing to switch from 
the default contract to the alternate contract over a range of 
prices.  
To evaluate the alternative contract in this case study, we 
iteratively constructed the price-quantity curve shown in Fig. 6 
by solving (6), starting with a price of $30 million for the 
alternate contract and assuming that no hours and starts have 
been accumulated under the existing default contracts. The 
curve describes how many plants in the power system would 
switch LTSAs at each given price for the alternate contract.  
At a price of $30 million, all plants remained on the default 
LTSA. Then, we iteratively decremented the price of the alter-
nate contract and resolved (6) until all plants switched over to 
the alternate LTSA. At a price of $10 million for the alternate 
contract, all plants switched (this is to be expected, as the 
alternate contract offers more starts for the same number of 
firing hours, and the default contract costs $10 million). 
 
Fig. 6. Price-quantity curve for alternate LTSA contract 
Although the price-quantity curve shown above illustrates 
the number of power plants that should switch to the alternate 
contract at a specific price, for the purposes of renegotiating 
an existing LTSA portfolio, the amount of money that a firm 
should be willing to pay is not the price of the alternate con-
tract. The per-plant maximum amount that a firm should be 
willing to pay to switch to the alternate contract is equal to the 
highest price in the bid curve for each quantity of generators 
that would switch less the price of the default LTSA. For ex-
ample, if the premium for the alternate contract is $18 million, 
the portfolio owner should be willing to pay 
($18 - $10 million) = $8 million/GFPP to switch five GFPPs. 
Fig. 7 illustrates this per-plant renegotiation premium for 
different alternate LTSA prices. 
 
Fig. 7. Renegotiation premium to switch LTSAs 
C. The impact of VERs on an optimal LTSA portfolio 
To examine the impact of renewables on GFPP cycling, we 
examined five different VER penetration scenarios across five 
different alternate LTSA prices. In the default scenario, every 
GFPP in the portfolio operates under the default LTSA with a 
premium of $10 million and a rectangular MIF that allows a 
maximum of 25,000 firing hours and 250 starts. 
To investigate the impacts of VER penetration on the opti-
mal choices for an LTSA portfolio, we constructed price-
quantity curves using the proposed iterative approach to price 
an alternate LTSA with an unknown price premium. Fig. 8 
shows the price-quantity curves for the different penetration 
scenarios. 
 
Fig. 8. Optimal LTSA portfolios under increasing penetrations of VERs 
As the VER penetration level increases, the curve shifts 
right, and the optimal portfolio contains increasingly more 
switches to the alternate contract at higher price premiums. As 
before, we can also evaluate the price that a firm should be 
willing to pay to renegotiate its LTSAs by taking the differ-
ence between the highest price for each quantity and subtract-
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ing the price of the default LTSA. Given the rightward shift of 
the price-quantity curve at higher VER penetrations, we can 
infer that switching to the more flexible alternate LTSA be-
comes increasingly beneficial to the firm as the increasing 
VER penetration forces its plants to cycle more frequently; 
additionally, as the number of starts for both contracts is the 
same, but the more flexible contract allows 500 more starts, 
we can also infer that the greater VER penetration scenarios 
require the firm’s GFPP fleet to cycle more frequently. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a formulation built upon a detailed defini-
tion of the UC problem—taking into explicit consideration the 
different maintenance interval functions and premiums of 
alternative LTSAs—that optimizes a long-term service agree-
ment portfolio for a set of gas-fired power plants. We have 
shown that an optimal LTSA portfolio strategy can involve 
signing different LTSAs for different plants where some 
plants may have higher firing-hours-to-starts ratios than other 
plants in the same portfolio. We have demonstrated an itera-
tive method to evaluate an alternate LTSA with an unknown 
premium, proposed a method to calculate the lump sum for 
renegotiation that a firm should be willing to pay, and ex-
plored the impact of variable energy resources on optimal 
LTSA choices and the corresponding system costs. 
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